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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on experiences in other industries, this paper argues that the business of addiction 
treatment is likely to be transformed by the advent of a period of consolidation, in which a 
number of small, independent programs will be acquired by larger, better-capitalized, and 
managerially more sophisticated enterprises. Consolidation will be driven by opportunities to 
leverage new technologies, to exploit new regulatory initiatives, and to introduce economies of 
scale and scope into an industry that is currently highly fragmented. The process is likely to 
result in segmentation of the market, with the coexistence of large, generalist, highly 
standardized firms and a number of small, highly specialized firms. When an industry 
consolidates, the types and quality of services provided can improve through the adoption of best 
practices and through increased competition among larger providers. If these larger providers are 
publicly traded, however, efforts to improve will inevitably be influenced by pressures to 
maintain or increase quarter-to-quarter earnings and share price, leaving open the long term 
impact on service quality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of industrial evolution contains many lessons that are relevant today in general and 
in particular to the addiction treatment field. Patterns can be observed in the way industries have 
evolved, and these patterns can help us anticipate likely trajectories for industries such as 
addiction treatment in the future. Historically there are two kinds of transformational forces that 
affect an industry.  
 
Transformational Change from Outside the Field - First, there are fundamental, even 
revolutionary changes that are propelled by technologicalinnovation. New, transformational 
technologies, however, are frequently not applied or even recognized by the dominant firms in an 
established industry, typically because those new technologies cannot be easily merged with 
their firms’ established methods and because they threaten their established markets. Examples 
of highly successful firms being unable to anticipate or recognize important innovations abound, 
as Christiansen (1997) and many others have observed. One has to go no further than the 
telephone or the camera to get a sense of the argument. AT&T dominated both the local and the 
long distance telephone markets for decades, but following the break-up in the 1980’s it 
stumbled badly and was unable to maintain its technological or distributional leadership. 
Polaroid dominated the film-based instant photography industry for decades, but had great 
difficulty anticipating the impact of digital technology and making the transition away from film 
and into the digital environment (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). For the addiction treatment industry, 
the implication is that significant transformation is possible; that it is likely to be driven by 
technological innovation and that it is likely to be stimulated by developments outside the field 
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as we know it today. New organizations (and perhaps new organizational forms), are likely to be 
leaders in the transformation process. Such significant transformation may be just around the 
corner or may be years in the making. The technological innovations that may lead to 
transformational change are difficult to predict and thus will not be the focus of the present 
paper. Instead, we pay attention to existing innovations that, applied to field, have the potential 
to stimulate change. We use the lessons of history to anticipate the types of improvement in 
managerial processes and in quality of services provided as the addiction treatment industry goes 
through a period of consolidation. 
 
 
 
 Change From Within an Industry Through Consolidation - Consolidation occurs in the evolution 
of every industry. Industries tend to follow a life cycle, with a stage of rapid growth initially, 
characterized by the entry of a large number of firms and a relatively small exit rate. This is 
followed by a plateau, where the rates of entry and exit are similar. This plateau is typically 
followed by a shakeout period, where a large number of firms exit or are merged with existing 
competitors. Finally, the industry population stabilizes with a smaller number of firms and lower 
entry and exit rates. 
 
The processes of firm growth that lead ultimately to consolidation within an industry are 
generally of two types: 
a) Organic growth, when a firm grows by expanding its capabilities and routines 
internally. 
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b) Growth through acquisition, when a firm buys-out competitors in order to grow and 
exploit unrealized opportunities (such as exploitation of market power, technological 
or managerial advantages). 
Organic growth is likely to result in consolidation in the long run, as the emergence of leadership 
and market dominance by large firms slows down new entry into the industry and increases the 
exit rate. Growth through acquisition, on the other hand, results in industry consolidation in a 
relatively short period of time. In this paper we pay particular attention to “roll-ups”, a form of 
horizontal consolidation in which a single firm acquires a large number of similar competitors, 
and that typically occurs in a relatively short period of time, often due to a change in regulations 
by government. 
An instructive example of rapid consolidation comes from the early 20th century case of General 
Motors. In 1908, GM was founded as a holding company for Buick, then controlled by William 
C. Durant. It acquired Oldsmobile later that year, and the next year, acquired Cadillac, Elmore, 
and Oakland. By 1920, GM had acquired many other small car and auto part manufacturers, 
acquisitions that in Durant’s view were no more than acquiring patents and plants to satisfy an 
ever-expanding market. The goal of GM, in a market driven by demand, was to expand 
production and distribution, without concern for costs or administrative capabilities. The crisis of 
the 1920s found GM in a poor position to face a dramatic drop in demand. During the 1920’s the 
ability to produce at lower cost became crucial and the lack of administrative capabilities to 
manage costs and quality forced Durant to sell GM to the DuPont family. The gap in 
administrative capabilities was closed by the DuPonts by introducing standard, state-of-the-art 
administrative practices across the different subsidiaries. In so doing they were able to turn GM 
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around. To summarize, the consolidation in the automotive industry that GM led in the early 
1900s was initially motivated by an interest in controlling and diffusing new technology across 
the entire company and in securing market access. However, in the 1920s, continued profit 
opportunities resided in the ability to adopt improved administrative practices and to diffuse 
them across the subsidiaries. 
A similar case is found in the tobacco industry where the American Tobacco Company (ATC) 
was created in 1890, a trust owned by James B. Duke, as a roll-up that included more than 200 
small firms. In this case the roll-up motivation was technology (new packaging systems), market 
access and buying power. Interestingly, this roll-up was too successful. The resulting market 
power for ATC led tobacco planters early in the 20th century to form the Dark Tobacco District 
Planters’ Protective Association of Kentucky and Tennessee, in an attempt to counter ATC’s 
power. As a result, in 1911, ATC was broken up by an antitrust action. 
 
WHAT ARE THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS THAT PROMOTE ROLL-UPS? 
Roll-ups in particular and industry consolidation in general occur in response to opportunities 
deriving from sources such as technological innovation, regulation, finance, and bargaining 
power. 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION. When new technology provides superior performance relative to 
the existing technology, the unrealized benefits create a profit opportunity through consolidation. 
Here we refer to technology quite broadly; we do not just include manufacturing technology, or 
in the case of the health industry, treatments, equipment or medication - but also administrative 
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and operational practices. For example, in the automobile industry firms have become more 
competitive by adopting JIT (just-in-time) and lean manufacturing practices, administrative and 
operational procedures that can lead to improved quality at reduced costs. 
Roll-ups are possible, in part, because of the natural inertia of incumbent firms. The adoption of 
new technology is imbued with a great deal of uncertainty, and managers have a tendency to 
stick to what is known and to avoid the new and untested. Firms with underperforming 
technology become targets for those possessing a new technology because the acquiring firms 
can obtain higher profit margins by reducing costs when introducing the new systems. 
 
REGULATION can be either a facilitator of or an obstacle to roll-ups. As we saw in the case of the 
anti-trust ruling in the tobacco industry, regulation can impede the emergence of roll-ups. On the 
other hand, regulatory changes can also create consolidation opportunities, as in the case of the 
banking industry or the airline industry. In 1980, for example, the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act allowed banks to merge across state lines. It thus 
provided an opportunity for those with advanced technology to target underperforming banks for 
purchase, then transfer the advanced technology and benefit from the improved performance. 
BankOne, for example, took advantage of this legislation and developed the ability to transfer its 
above average expertise and knowledge in the areas of operations and information systems into 
acquisitions, thereby realizing the economic benefits (Szulanski, 2001; Winter & Szulanski, 
2001).  
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FINANCING. Financing is usually a major constraint for small firms, particularly in expanding 
markets. The roll-up of small firms into a larger organization can provide the size needed to 
access financial markets.  
 
INCREASED BARGAINING POWER. By becoming a larger customer or supplier, the bargaining 
position of the acquiring firm is improved. An example would be HMOs, which are able to 
negotiate better prices from health providers than any individual patient or employer due to the 
business volume they bring to a service provider included in their “network.” Bargaining power 
is relevant not only as a customer but also as a supplier, as in the case of OPEC, where oil 
producers, by creating a cartel, have been able to influence the price of oil. A recurrent pattern in 
the evolution of industries is that consolidation at one stage in the value chain creates a chain 
reaction. Usually, customers react to supplier consolidation by consolidating themselves in order 
to counter the bargaining power of their suppliers. In a similar manner, suppliers also react to 
customer consolidation in the same way – as we saw in the case of the tobacco industry in the 
early 1900’s. 
WHAT ARE THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF ROLL-UPS? 
McKelvey (1999) discusses three strategic objectives in industry roll-ups: economies of scale, 
value-cost leveraging and redefining products or services (see Figure 1). He presents examples of 
strategic objectives for different industries and the criteria utilized to identify targets to acquire 
(see Figure 2) that illustrate the points made in this section.  
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE. Consolidation within an industry opens the opportunity to 
exploit economies of scale by providing services and products to a larger customer base. This, in 
turn leads to reduced fixed costs per unit manufactured or serviced, since from an administrative 
point of view, the cost of supporting activities usually does not increase in direct proportion to 
the number of services provided. In addition, the increased number of business firms acquired 
through consolidation can provide valuable new information and a learning opportunity that 
reduces costs and waste (learning curve). Also deriving from economies of scale are the benefits 
that accrue in operations and services from the mastery gained by people performing the service 
more times. This repetition usually reduces errors and improves quality, a fact that has been well 
documented (Huckman & Pisano, forthcoming; Pisano, Bohmer, & Edmondson, 2001). 
Consolidation also provides opportunities to exploit economies of scope. A larger customer base 
can justify the provision of a range of services that would not be feasible for a smaller clientele. 
For example, the new, larger organization can create a specialized unit to centralize the provision 
of a particular service, when it is not profitable to provide it in a decentralized manner, and refer 
the clients to the specialized unit in order to achieve economies of scope. Through unit 
specialization, firms can increase the scope of services provided while taking advantage of the 
quality and cost improvements derived from specialization itself. 
 Page   9 
INFORMATION SHARING. There are several information-related benefits that can accrue to the 
firm that has acquired or consolidated other firms. First, a larger amount of information may 
reach the organization from different geographic locations, providing information about market 
tendencies and other forms of feedback. Second, information gleaned from experiential learning 
can be shared across the whole organization, and practices and solutions can be tried in different 
environments, helping management understand what works and what does not and why. Finally, 
the larger number of cases with which the organization has direct experience may facilitate better 
understanding of the causal connections between organizational action and resulting 
performance. 
By being part of the same organization, the different units fall under a hierarchical control 
system that can facilitate the transfer of information and knowledge. Research by Knott (2001), 
for example, shows that franchisees that become independent are typically outperformed by 
those that remain members of the franchise. This appears to be true even for those firms having 
knowledge of the franchise operation procedures and controlling for size and other benefits that 
can be derived from being part of the franchise. This somewhat counter-intuitive finding 
suggests that the potential costs of increasing bureaucratization are outweighed by gains in 
information accessibility and timeliness.    
 
BEST PRACTICES ADOPTION . The hierarchical structure of a larger (merged) firm can provide the 
channels and control systems that facilitate the adoption of preferred practices across units; 
especially if managers design incentives to favor their adoption. For a manager in charge of an 
autonomous business, engaging in change may not be justified because of the risk of failure and 
the cost of engaging in the change. However, when the same manager is in charge of the same 
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business but now as a part of a larger organization through acquisition, the risk of failure is 
distributed over a wider set of units within the whole organization. In addition, other units within 
the larger organization can be called upon to transfer their experiential learning in support of the 
manager’s change effort, thus reducing costs of learning and the risks of failure. In fact, under 
these circumstances it may be more costly not to engage in change. 
 
Hierarchical control combined with more complete information available to managers provides 
an environment where it is in theory easier to achieve change and adopt best practices. Evidence 
from the field of medicine is illustrative. Treatment models emphasizing combinations of 
methods (training primary care physicians, patient education, on-site consultation by mental 
health specialist, and close medication adherence and case management monitoring) have been 
found to be more likely to promote the adoption of new practices and guidelines than those 
models relying in single methods (such as mailing lists, or training primary care physicians) and 
to have better patient outcomes (Katon et al., 1999; Katzelnick et al., 2000; Rubenstein et al., 
1999; Simon, VonKorff, Rutter, & Wagner, 2000).  
 
 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF CONSOLIDATION IN ADDICTION TREATMENT 
 
Consolidation has begun in the addiction treatment industry ("Creative Socio-Medics Parent 
Acquires CMHC," 2005; Jackson, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c) and it has the potential to improve 
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efficiency and effectiveness in the industry substantially. What benefits might we anticipate from 
consolidation in the addiction treatment industry? In discussing the potential benefits of railroad 
consolidation in the 1920s, Daniel (1924) argued that “in the absence of any even approximate 
estimate of the economies under consolidation it becomes at once speculative to guess at the 
degree in which net economies would result…” What was true for railroads 80 years ago is just 
as true for addiction treatment today; it is impossible to predict with certainty how consolidation 
will affect economies in the addiction treatment field. However, it is clear that the benefits that 
may accrue from consolidation in addiction treatment are not just economic (mainly achieved 
through cost reduction), but also lie in improvements in quality and performance (achieved by 
adoption of best practices and technology). And if addiction treatment is effective, then its 
benefits would be felt on a much wider basis as former addicts resume productive social roles at 
work, in their families, and in their neighborhoods. 
COST IMPROVEMENT 
Insurance and Medicare pressure  
The current dependency of addiction treatment centers on payments from Medicare and 
Medicaid – often acting through intermediary Managed Care Organizations – presents a 
strong incentive for consolidation in the industry. Reduced costs of collection and 
simplified payment systems can be achieved by consolidation thereby improving the 
addiction treatment centers’ negotiating position with payers and reducing the number of 
actors they have to deal with. 
 
New technologies and practices 
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McLellan argues that the diffusion of evidence-based treatments such as new 
medications, therapies and interventions in addiction treatment in general has been 
disturbingly slow. Research by Mark and colleagues (2003) confirms this view. Were a 
number of SAT centers consolidated and integrated into a hierarchy, the headquarters 
could facilitate adoption of improved treatment models. By managing incentives for 
addiction treatment center managers, headquarters could promote the implementation of 
treatment-oriented evidence-based practices. 
 
Improved administrative routines  
A variety of studies in different states has shown that there is wide room for improvement 
in the adoption of improved administrative routines. Some of these include shorter times 
between first contact (telephone) with the treatment center, and improved customer 
service practices to support patient retention (See Gustafson et al., 2005). A consolidated 
hierarchical structure can provide the means to insure the adoption of such routines. 
 
We expect to find sizeable gains from consolidation in these three areas. Consolidation should 
reduce the cost of transactions by centralizing the administration of the collection of account 
receivables. Consolidated firms should be able to leverage the potential inherent in innovations 
in information technology since they will be able to invest in more sophisticated systems. The 
adoption of new treatments has the potential to improve outcomes, reducing recidivism and 
length of treatment. Improved administrative routines have the potential to affect many aspects in 
the organization, from the number of patients with access to the service, to the length of service, 
to patient retention. These factors can have a large impact on the economics of the business on 
both the cost and the revenue side.  
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Although the potential benefits of consolidation in the addiction treatment industry are 
considerable, there is no guarantee that the benefits will be realized. However, we expect that the 
combination of cost reduction and revenue increases will result in greater efficiency and 
effectiveness at the level of individual SAT centers and greater overall value for patients and 
society as a whole.  
 
At the state level, regulatory changes can lead to similar results by imposing requirements for 
participation in state-funded initiatives on the addiction treatment centers. For example, by 
linking participation in the state substance abuse treatment programs to the adoption of evidence-
based treatments and managerial best practices, the State of Delaware has been able to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of the substance abuse treatment facilities statewide (Kemp, 2005). 
 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
PROS AND CONS OF DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURES: WHAT DO WE KNOW? 
Structure by itself provides no guarantee of success or failure, as the examples we will present 
shortly demonstrate. Market structures open different possibilities and the ability to achieve 
certain goals. While a decentralized, fragmented market structure favors experimentation and the 
finding of new business opportunities, a concentrated market facilitates the exploitation of 
developed knowledge and the adoption of best practices consistently across the board. 
Concentration is the result of a few firms controlling most of the market, and that is only realized 
by achieving above-average efficiency. The dominant firms in an industry tend to adopt state-of-
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the-art technologies and managerial practices and to be able to implement them, something that 
smaller firms are not prone to do because of their size constraints, greater risks relative to gains, 
and other inertial forces. 
 
Following Thompson’s (1967) seminal work, management researchers have studied how the 
benefits of centralized versus decentralized decision making structures depend on the 
contingencies faced by the organizations. Recent studies based on simulations have shown that 
decentralized decision-making reaches higher payoffs when knowledge is uncertain and 
exploration is widespread. However, in later stages, centralized decision-making obtains superior 
returns as what is known to be a superior strategy is broadly and widely exploited (Siggelkow 
and Levinthal, 2003; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003, Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005). Hierarchies, 
with the information they access from their subunits, obtain a more comprehensive picture and 
are able to select and adopt the solutions with the higher payoffs, be they technical or 
administrative. In addition, they can facilitate information exchange across units, which 
smoothes the process of adopting best practices. Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) also show that 
organizations benefit from moving from centralization to decentralization when the environment 
changes and exploration of new alternatives is needed. Following this logic, we posit that the 
addiction treatment industry is in a stage where centralization is beneficial. Centralization can 
help spread what the industry has learned by selecting the solutions that provide higher 
“payoffs,” as we will argue in the following paragraphs. 
 
Hierarchical organization provides control systems that facilitate the adoption of new, innovative 
technologies and practices. Headquarters can establish incentives, training, information sharing, 
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and follow up systems to facilitate the diffusion and adoption of change by lower level 
management; incentives and systems that are usually not present when the manager acts 
independently. To illustrate, we use two examples from the agricultural sector. First is the case of 
a dairy product organization in Uruguay. Until the 1930s, the market for dairy products in 
Uruguay was highly fragmented, with a large number of independent milk producers processing 
milk supplied by themselves and other small producers. Quality was mixed, and, overall, this 
system created a health risk, since the state found it impossible to impose and control sanitary 
conditions. In 1936, the Uruguayan government promoted the creation of CONAPROLE (a 
cooperative of milk producers) with a mixed ownership structure (a board with representation of 
the state and the producers) as an umbrella under which most of the producers were incorporated. 
Small milk producers remained the owners of the production facilities, but obtained access to 
lower cost credit, technological support, and a buyer for their milk production from 
CONAPROLE. CONAPROLE concentrated milk processing into 2 plants, which allowed the 
cooperative to invest in new technology, improving quality and safety of dairy products. Seventy 
years later and operating 8 plants, CONAPROLE became the Uruguayan top exporter of dairy 
products, having been able to access and compete in European and Latin-American markets. 
Consolidation, driven by the government, enabled technological innovation and the development 
of capabilities that made the Uruguayan dairy industry a viable competitor in world markets. 
Our second example is the wine industry in Mendoza, Argentina. Argentina has made itself a 
player in the world wine market in the last 10 years, going from almost zero to capturing 2.5% of 
the world market (McDermott, 2005). A province located by the Andes Mountains, on the border 
with Chile, Mendoza’s largest winery was run by the provincial government and produced wine 
of low quality in a province where private wineries and vineyards were abundant. The private 
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wineries and vineyards had a long tradition with some of them being considered the best in 
Argentina. The wine from those private wineries has been compared favorably to good Chilean 
wines. In the late 80s, the Government of Mendoza decided to spin-off its winery and vineyards 
and created FECOVITA, a cooperative with mixed ownership structure (grape producers, winery 
and provincial government have representation on the board). The ownership of the land was 
given to the grape producers (a large number of small vineyards in the eastern zone). The winery 
was put under control of FECOVITA. In 10 years, this winery became one of the best in the 
province, exporting wine that has been recognized among the best by Wine Spectator. 
FECOVITA became a facilitator of state-of-the-art technology adoption by the vineyards. New 
varietals and quality improvement are the foundation of FECOVITA’s wines success.  
 
This example illustrates the point that it is not the structure per se but how it is implemented that 
makes a difference. Before the inception of FECOVITA, the same vineyards, winery and people 
were involved in the production of wine in a hierarchical structure. This organization, managed 
by an inefficient bureaucratic system, was unable to take advantage of the opportunities that 
were available. In the next section we draw a second lesson from the Mendoza wine industry 
experience: the importance of institutions and how government can support the transfer of 
knowledge and adoption of innovation.  
PROMOTION OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND ADOPTION OF INNOVATION AT THE INDUSTRY 
LEVEL: WHAT DO WE KNOW?  
 
The case of the wine industry in Mendoza is also illustrative of how institutions can support the 
sharing of knowledge and adoption of innovations by firms. In his comparative study of the 
provincial wine industry, McDermott (2005) presents evidence of the effect of two different 
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approaches to the promotion of technology transfer and adoption of best practices. While both 
Mendoza and San Juan provinces were similar in almost every aspect that affected wine 
production (climate, economic development, population, etc.), they were quite different with 
regard to the approach taken by their provincial governments. San Juan’s government based its 
industrial policy on economic incentives (tax breaks, favorable regulation, etc.), while 
Mendoza’s government engaged in the creation of public-private institutions, which provided 
deliberative forums for improving public policy and favored collective action.  
 
Mendoza’s government created inclusive public-private institutions, aiming to solve particular 
problems found by organizations in the sector, where the relevant industry actors were integrated 
together with the provincial government. When new problems surfaced, new institutions with the 
same philosophy were created. This process created institutions that provided forums for 
discussion that integrated members of isolated clusters and facilitated collective action. In 
addition, the manner by which members were brought into these institutions guaranteed the 
creation of many ties among institutions. As a result, the transfer of experiential knowledge and 
information across social and geographic distances was facilitated and promoted. The 
experimentation with new technology and the flow of information across firm boundaries made 
possible a broad technological and managerial revolution. Another important advantage of this 
evolution is that it appears to have reduced variability across different growers. In Mendoza’s 
most backward region, even the least developed growers have caught up with the best in the 
province. Similar results were not achieved by San Juan. The economic incentives, while 
yielding isolated success cases, were not able to bridge the gap between different sectors of its 
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wine industry and knowledge remained localized within only a few firms without reaching the 
rest of the industry. 
 
This story of competition-cooperation in the case of vineyards and wineries in Mendoza is 
important to highlight. Commercial relationships between grape producers and wineries are 
informal and not ruled by contracts. The lack of long term contracts exposes the producers and 
wineries to opportunistic behavior from the counterpart. For example, vineyards may be forced 
to accept lower prices for their grapes because the investment made to grow the grapes according 
to winery specifications may not be reflected in the price for other buyers. However, in general, 
the relationships between producers and wineries are characterized by cooperation. Even though 
competition in local markets is strong, cooperation between wineries or producers is still present 
and knowledge spillovers are common because participants compete together in the larger world 
market as Argentinean wine producers. There are also economies from participating in a high 
quality cluster. Quality of the wine is defined by the lowest quality of the grapes used in 
production; hence any quality improvement in varietals will only result in better wine when all 
the producers supply similar, high quality grapes. Limited competition, interdependence between 
producers and wineries, and an institutional structure that leads to dense networks of firms can 
generate an atmosphere that is conducive to cooperation among firms within the industry. 
 
DOES ANY OF THIS APPLY TO ADDICTION TREATMENT INDUSTRY? 
Why is this relevant to the addiction treatment industry? Several similarities between the wine 
industry in Mendoza and the contemporary addiction treatment industry should be noted. First, 
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competition between centers is quite limited to geographically proximate organizations. 
Although a few customers may go to centers that are distant, in general this is not the case. 
Studies have estimated that customers for hospitals are drawn from the population in a 100 mile 
radius. In the case of addiction treatment centers, this distance is likely to be much shorter. This 
could reduce limits on information sharing with other members of the industry. 
  
Second, like the addiction treatment field vineyards and wineries were not a concentrated 
industry by any means. There were thousands of grape producers and more than 200 wineries in 
Mendoza province alone. The majority of the vineyards were small firms, with a size that made 
acquisition of high technology machinery not profitable. In the addiction treatment field, as 
McLellan and Meyers (2004) point out, treatment centers are generally small, lacking expensive, 
technologically advanced staff (physicians, psychologists, social workers) and it is not 
uncommon for them to be run by part-time managers with little formal training in administration.  
 
Third, in general, addiction treatment centers appear to be quite isolated, which limits their 
ability to learn from the experiences of others, a situation prevalent in Mendoza wine industry 
during the 1980s. The isolation is not limited to the lack of interaction with other centers, but 
also with institutions such as research centers, medical schools, and other health care 
organizations (McLellan, 2002; McLellan & Meyers, 2004). The creation of institutions to bring 
these organizations together into forums opens the opportunity for collective action. It has the 
potential to facilitate transfer of experiential knowledge between the participants, and to 
encourage the adoption of best practices and evidence-based technologies.  
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ADDICTION TREATMENT INDUSTRY STRUCTURE  
The addiction treatment industry is characterized by a large number of small centers that draw 
their patients from relatively small geographic areas. In recent years, and mainly promoted by the 
drive to cut costs, these centers have begun to face strong pressures to increase their efficiency. 
The health care sector has already experienced this push, resulting in consolidation within the 
hospital industry, and it appears that consolidation in the addiction treatment industry is 
imminent.  
 
Until recently, the market structure could be represented by Figure 3. A state or federally funded 
office paid a multitude of small centers without any interaction beyond the financial relationship, 
leaving administrative and technical management in the hands of the centers. More recently, 
states have started to experiment with Managed Care Organizations to administer their addiction 
treatment programs, which led to efforts to cut costs and improve efficiency while maintaining 
access to those in need (Figure 4 represents this structure). This development may have been the 
initial signal of serious consolidation in the industry. Under a consolidation scenario, we would 
expect several behavioral health programs to be grouped together within a single behavioral 
service network of centers specialized in different areas. A recent example is the CRC Health 
Group (Jackson, 2005b) which now owns 110 addiction treatment centers in more than 20 states, 
providing drug and alcohol treatment services in residential, outpatient and methadone 
maintenance clinics. At the state level there are now many carve-out managed care organizations 
such as MHMA (subsidiary of First Mental Health, Inc) in Massachusetts, Iowa’s substance 
abuse carve-out (IMSACP), and the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System are forces 
for standardization. It would seem that Managed Care has the potential to improve the efficiency 
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and to help diffuse technology in the treatment of substance abuse patients, and to foster the 
spread of evidence-based clinical practices. 
 
 Based on our studies of other industries, as well as some knowledge of the forces currently 
operating within the addiction treatment field, we expect the emergence of large organizations 
with treatment centers covering larger geographical areas (regional or national) specializing in 
particular treatments, taking advantage of improved managerial practices and facilitating the 
adoption of evidence based technologies. We expect that the large organizations will have strong 
economic incentives to adopt standardization, which will in turn promote efficient monitoring 
and control of both the clinical and administrative processes. Independent addiction treatment 
centers are unlikely to disappear completely, however. If, the scenario described above actually 
occurs, it could in turn constrain the number and flexibility of treatment programs and leave 
some market spaces without coverage. Those conditions could create room for small, flexible 
organizations. The structure we expect to result from this dynamic in the market is represented in 
Figure 5. This market structure is already present in many industries and has been extensively 
studied by Caroll and colleagues (Baum & Haveman, 1997; Baum & Korn, 1996; Baum & 
Mezias, 1992; Baum & Singh, 1994; Carroll, 1985). To cite but one example, the newspaper 
industry is characterized by the presence of a small number of national newspapers and a large 
number of local newspapers in dynamic equilibrium, effectively partitioning the market into 
generalists – national newspapers – and specialists – local newspapers (Carroll, 1985). 
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INSERT FIGURES 4, 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Change in the industry is likely to be generated through both competition – bottom-up forces –
and mimetic – top-down forces (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Large firms, because of their ability 
and incentives to adopt state-of-the-art technology and business practices, are likely to become 
first movers and may serve as a model to the rest of the industry. Other firms will then have a 
template to imitate and learn from. Competition is a powerful incentive, and to avoid falling 
behind, other firms mimic the behavior of the more successful ones. Consolidated firms could 
then set the standard by which all the firms will be measured and constituencies (patients and 
payors) will impose those standards on the rest of the industry. The force of the constituencies is 
likely to push others into adopting those practices and technologies. Managed care organizations 
may play a crucial role in this process, by imposing qualifying requirements across the industry.  
 
In addition, we expect that, as institutions such as managed care organizations impose demands 
on the industry to introduce change, forums promoting interaction among addiction treatment 
centers and between the centers and the states will be created, leading to further diffusion of best 
practices in both the managerial and clinical domains. 
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CONCLUSION 
To summarize, if the history of industry evolution is any guide, we can expect that consolidation 
will occur within the addiction treatment industry through changes in managed care 
organizations and through acquisition of small programs by a few well-capitalized firms. In turn, 
we expect that these consolidated organizations will become catalysts for adoption of innovation, 
leading to improvements in efficiency and quality across the addiction treatment industry.  
As early adopters, consolidated firms will show what can be done, moving knowledge from the 
realm of theoretical to actionable, setting the standards and serving as templates for others. 
Other, smaller programs may mimic the practices of these larger leading firms so as not to fall 
behind. Meanwhile, changes in the managed care industry may make managed care 
organizations the agents of coercive change, forcing all programs in their control to adopt the 
new industry standards. Such forces may push reluctant firms to adopt innovations, which is 
likely to improve the efficiency and quality of their services.  
 
While improvements in both efficiency and quality are certainly possible as an industry 
consolidates, they are not inevitable. Ownership may make a difference. Private, for-profit 
enterprises, for example, may emphasize improvements in efficiency to a greater extent than 
improvements in quality. Enterprises that are publicly traded will face pressures to maintain or 
grow quarter-to-quarter earnings and share price and may be tempted to emphasize cost control 
as a result. On the other hand, not-for-profit enterprises may lack the kind of managerial 
sophistication and discipline that would yield greater efficiencies. Thus the links between 
consolidation and improvements in quality and efficiency are not necessarily direct. 
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We see this as the likely story of industry evolution driven by forces within the field. There is, 
however, always the potential for fundamental transformation driven by a brand new technology 
(medications, monitoring technology, etc.) or business model developed by an industry or a firm 
outside the addiction treatment field. Regardless of which forces occur and in which order, it is 
clear that those very structures we see emerging today will themselves be challenged as the 
evolutionary story in addiction treatment continues to unfold tomorrow. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Strategic Objectives in Industry Roll-Ups 
Health Clubs Combined "back-office" procedures are more 
efficient than individual club departments Economies of 
Scale 
Funeral Services Centralized purchasing of caskets and flowers to achieve better pricing 
Temporary Help 
Consolidated data entry, billing, hiring, and 
resume searching reduces costs and ensures 
customers the most appropriate help Value-Cost 
Leveraging 
Veterinary Services 
Uniform operating and pricing policies 
simplify procedures and reduce customers' risk 
and uncertainty 
Golfing Ranges Adequate financing enables doubled capacity 
with multi-level grandstands Redefining 
Product or Service 
Pagers National service is far more valuable than independent regional operators 
Source: McKelvey, P. 1999. The ties that bind in roll-up plays that work. Mergers & Acquisitions: The 
Dealermaker's Journal, 33(6): 37. 
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Figure 2. Screening Targets for the Roll-Up 
EXAMPLE ROLL-UP 
STRATEGY 
INDUSTRY 
EXAMPLE 
SAMPLE ACQUISITION CRITERIA 
SG&A Rationalization 
Opportunity Legal Services 
* High SG&A as a % of sales 
* Overhead functions can be centralized 
Purchasing Power Funeral Services 
* High COGS as a % of sales 
* Small/medium-sized companies with 
little purchasing power 
Marketing 
Advantages/Brand Name Health Clubs 
* Location(s) within regional cluster 
* Local reputation consistent with 
corporate strategy 
Opportunities to leverage 
advanced information 
technology systems 
Temporary Help * Operating procedure which can be 
made efficient through MIS technology 
Ability to attract professional 
management Lawn Care 
* Underperforming services organization 
(e.g., marketing, operations, etc.) within 
limited general management capabilities 
Source: McKelvey, P. 1999. The ties that bind in roll-up plays that work. Mergers & Acquisitions: The 
Dealermaker's Journal, 33(6): 37. 
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Figure 3. Applying McKelvey’s Analysis to the Addiction Treatment Industry 
 
ISSUE FACTORS TO CONSIDER Addiction Treatment Industry 
Economies of scale Reduced administrative costs,  
Value-cost leveraging More efficient technology can reduce costs and increase value Value Chain Analysis  
Product or service redefinition Sustainable competitive advantage can be provided by location 
Replicable, efficient operating model Evidence-based treatments and administrative practices 
Proven success States experience with Managed Care, Gustafson 
and colleagues study 
Platform 
Availability  
Cultural fit and committed 
management  
Large number of available targets 13,000 SAT centers 
Adequate average revenue per 
company  
Add-On 
Availability  
High level of value-creation per 
acquisition 
Large proportion with room for improvement 
(treatments and administration) 
Standard business model Targets are small and tractable 
Predictability of revenues and costs Stable market and demand Cost of Due 
Diligence  
Low probability of extraordinary cost 
(litigation risk) 
No clear reason for increased risk from 
consolidation 
 
 
Adapted from McKelvey, P. 1999. The ties that bind in roll-up plays that work. Mergers & 
Acquisitions: The Dealermaker's Journal, 33(6): 37. 
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Current Structures: 
Figure 4         
 
Predicted Structure: 
Figure 5 
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